Do the main claims made in the abstract and introduction accurately reflect the paper's If you ran experiments... (a) Did you include the code, data, and instructions needed to reproduce the main experimental results (either in the supplemental material or as a URL)? [Y es] (b) Did you specify all the training details (e.g., data splits, hyperparameters, how they Did you report error bars (e.g., with respect to the random seed after running experiments multiple times)? Did you include the total amount of compute and the type of resources used (e.g., type Did you include any new assets either in the supplemental material or as a URL? [Y es] Did you discuss whether and how consent was obtained from people whose data you're If you used crowdsourcing or conducted research with human subjects... (a) Hyper-parameter V alues learning rate 0.0005, 0.0001 batch size 16, 32 " annealing period 20000, 10000 RNN hidden dimension 64, 32, 16 Table 2: Hyper-parameters of QMIX in the Tiger-Trampoline Experiment In Section 5.1, we show the results of MAPPO and QMIX on the Tiger-Trampoline game. In the Hanabi experiments, we implement IMPROVISED as follows (better viewed together with the pseudocode). Player 1 and player 2 do not share the random seed beforehand. We do not anticipate any immediate negative impact from this work.

Large language model (LLM) agents have shown remarkable progress in social deduction games (SDGs). However, existing approaches primarily focus on information processing and strategy selection, overlooking the significance of persuasive communication in influencing other players' beliefs and responses. In SDGs, success depends not only on making correct deductions but on convincing others to response in alignment with one's intent. To address this limitation, we formalize turn-based dialogue in SDGs as a Stackelberg competition, where the current player acts as the leader who strategically influences the follower's response. Building on this theoretical foundation, we propose a reinforcement learning framework that trains agents to optimize utterances for persuasive impact. Through comprehensive experiments across three diverse SDGs, we demonstrate that our agents significantly outperform baselines. This work represents a significant step toward developing AI agents capable of strategic social influence, with implications extending to scenarios requiring persuasive communication.

As a variant of the famous communication game Werewolf, One Night Ultimate W erewolf (ONUW) requires players to develop strategic discussion policies due to the potential role changes that increase the uncertainty and complexity of the game.

We investigate strategic deception in large language models using two complementary testbeds: Secret Agenda (across 38 models) and Insider Trading compliance (via SAE architectures). Secret Agenda reliably induced lying when deception advantaged goal achievement across all model families. Analysis revealed that autolabeled SAE features for "deception" rarely activated during strategic dishonesty, and feature steering experiments across 100+ deception-related features failed to prevent lying. Conversely, insider trading analysis using unlabeled SAE activations separated deceptive versus compliant responses through discriminative patterns in heatmaps and t-SNE visualizations. These findings suggest autolabel-driven interpretability approaches fail to detect or control behavioral deception, while aggregate unlabeled activations provide population-level structure for risk assessment. Results span Llama 8B/70B SAE implementations and GemmaScope under resource constraints, representing preliminary findings that motivate larger studies on feature discovery, labeling methodology, and causal interventions in realistic deception contexts.

In this paper, we focus on a specific subclass of coordination problems in which humans are able to discover self-explaining deviations (SEDs).

Achieving Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) requires AI agents that can not only make stratigic decisions but also engage in flexible and meaningful communication. Inspired by Wittgenstein's language game theory in Philosophical Investigations, we propose that language agents can learn through in-context interaction rather than traditional multi-stage frameworks that separate decision-making from language expression. Using Werewolf, a social deduction game that tests language understanding, strategic interaction, and adaptability, we develop the Multi-agent Kahneman & Tversky's Optimization (MaKTO). MaKTO engages diverse models in extensive gameplay to generate unpaired desirable and unacceptable responses, then employs KTO to refine the model's decision-making process. In 9-player Werewolf games, MaKTO achieves a 61% average win rate across various models, outperforming GPT-4o and two-stage RL agents by relative improvements of 23.0% and 10.9%, respectively. Notably, MaKTO also demonstrates human-like performance, winning 60% against expert players and showing only 49% detectability in Turing-style blind tests. These results showcase MaKTO's superior decision-making, strategic adaptation, and natural language generation in complex social deduction games.

In this paper, we propose a new method Strategist that utilizes LLMs to acquire new skills for playing multi-agent games through a self-improvement process. Our method gathers quality feedback through self-play simulations with Monte Carlo tree search and LLM-based reflection, which can then be used to learn high-level strategic skills such as how to evaluate states that guide the low-level execution.We showcase how our method can be used in both action planning and dialogue generation in the context of games, achieving good performance on both tasks. Specifically, we demonstrate that our method can help train agents with better performance than both traditional reinforcement learning-based approaches and other LLM-based skill learning approaches in games including the Game of Pure Strategy (GOPS) and The Resistance: Avalon.

Strategic social deduction games serve as valuable testbeds for evaluating the understanding and inference skills of language models, offering crucial insights into social science, artificial intelligence, and strategic gaming. This paper focuses on creating proxies of human behavior in simulated environments, with Among Us utilized as a tool for studying simulated human behavior. The study introduces a text-based game environment, named AmongAgents, that mirrors the dynamics of Among Us. Players act as crew members aboard a spaceship, tasked with identifying impostors who are sabotaging the ship and eliminating the crew. Within this environment, the behavior of simulated language agents is analyzed. The experiments involve diverse game sequences featuring different configurations of Crewmates and Impostor personality archetypes. Our work demonstrates that state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) can effectively grasp the game rules and make decisions based on the current context. This work aims to promote further exploration of LLMs in goal-oriented games with incomplete information and complex action spaces, as these settings offer valuable opportunities to assess language model performance in socially driven scenarios.